LEGAL ANGLE - SEPTEMBER 2026

No Ladder Required: New York’s Scaffold Law Can Apply Even When You’re on the Ground

A recent First Department decision provides an important warning about moving heavy electrical equipment on New York construction sites. New York electrical contractors routinely face a deceptively ordinary construction task: getting large electrical equipment from the point of delivery to its final location. That task can carry substantial liability under New York’s Labor Law.

In Canales v. Noble Construction Group, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op. 04473 (1st Dep’t July 16, 2026), the Appellate Division, First Department overturned a lower court’s dismissal of a Labor Law § 240(1) (the “Scaffold Law”) claim and held that an injured worker was entitled to summary judgment under the Scaffold Law after an 800-pound electrical cabinet was manually carried and ultimately pinned him against a wall. The court concluded that the accident involved an elevation-related risk and that an appropriate safety device, such as a hoist or forklift, should have been used.

For electrical contractors, the decision is significant because the accident did not involve a worker falling from a scaffold or ladder. Instead, the Scaffold Law issue arose from workers moving heavy electrical equipment horizontally through a construction site. This interpretation expands what one likely assumed the Scaffold Law to cover.

Facts of the case.

The plaintiff was a non-electrician construction worker who was helping co-workers move an 800-pound electrical cabinet. Plaintiff’s supervisor instructed him to assemble a group of co-workers to move and install the cabinet, despite Plaintiff’s complaints that they did not have the proper equipment to transport it.

The cabinet had been brought into the property using a lift. Once inside, however, Plaintiff and his co-workers manually carried it at approximately chest or knee height. During the move, one of the workers carrying the cabinet tripped on protruding rebar. The cabinet then pinned Plaintiff against a wall, causing his injuries.

The litigation involved the property owner, general contractor, and electrical contractor responsible for the cabinet. The parties disputed who directed the workers to move the cabinet and who was responsible for the manner in which it was transported. While those factual disputes remained important for the Labor Law § 200 (general duty to protect health and safety) and indemnification claims, they did not prevent the First Department from granting Plaintiff summary judgment on his Scaffold Law claim.

Why did the Scaffold Law apply?

The Scaffold Law requires contractors and owners to provide appropriate safety devices for workers exposed to certain elevation-related risks. Interestingly in this case, the First Department did not require Plaintiff to have fallen from an elevated surface. Instead, the court focused on the force of gravity acting on the heavy electrical cabinet and the failure to use an appropriate safety device.

The court relied on Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 599 (2009), and concluded that Plaintiff established that his injuries “flowed directly from the application of the force of gravity to the [cabinet].” The court further concluded that a safety device such as a hoist or forklift should have been used to transport the cabinet. Based on the court’s decision, a Scaffold Law analysis can turn on whether the task exposes workers to an elevation-related hazard and whether the weight of the object creates a foreseeable risk that an appropriate safety device should be used.

The rebar did not save the defendants from Scaffold Law liability

One of the interesting aspects of the decision is that the accident had an obvious alternative cause: a worker carrying the cabinet tripped on protruding rebar. The defendants argued that the rebar – not an elevation-related hazard – was the cause of the accident.

The First Department, however, rejected that argument and held that the presence of the rebar did not take the accident outside of the Scaffold Law. The court reasoned that the accident also arose, at least in part, from the failure to provide a safety device protecting the workers from the elevation-related risks associated with moving the heavy cabinet.

What are the implications for electrical contractors?

There are several takeaways for contractors based upon this decision.

First, do not treat heavy-equipment delivery and placement as merely a logistics issue. Electrical contractors should identify movement of heavy equipment as a separate safety-planning issue. Before delivery, contractors should consider: what equipment will be used to unload the equipment; how it will be transported inside the building; and what route will be used and whether there are stairs, ramps, elevation changes, uneven surfaces, penetrations, or other hazards along the route. The fact that workers previously moved similar equipment by hand does not necessarily establish that manual movement is appropriate or that no safety risks exist.

Second, a subcontractor should be cautious about asking another trade to move its equipment. The record in this case contained conflicting evidence concerning who directed the crew of non-electrical workers to participate in moving the electrical contractor’s cabinet. The First Department held that those disputes remained relevant to the Labor Law § 200 (general duty to protect health and safety) and indemnification claims.

For electrical contractors, the practical lesson is straightforward: if the electrical contractor owns the equipment and is responsible for getting it into position, the electrical contractor should clearly establish who is performing the move and how it will be performed. Informal requests such as “grab a few guys and help us move this” can create unnecessary risk, particularly when another subcontractor's employees are being asked to perform work outside of their normal scope.

Third, do not overlook site conditions. The incident in this case also demonstrates why contractors should pay attention to conditions created by other trades. The worker carrying the cabinet tripped on protruding rebar. Even though that condition contributed to the accident, the First Department still found a basis for the Scaffold Law to apply based on the failure to use an appropriate safety device.

This case is a significant reminder that New York's Scaffold Law is not limited to traditional falls from ladders and scaffolds. Contractors should take a closer look at how heavy equipment gets moved around the jobsite. An 800-pound electrical cabinet, a crew of workers, and an improvised manual-moving operation can create considerably more legal exposure than the parties may appreciate at the time. When the equipment can be moved with a hoist, forklift, or other appropriate device, the safer course may also be the legally safer course.

Andrew J. Mundo, Esq.
MURTAGH, COHEN, BYRNE, MURDY & MUNDO
amundo@MCB50Law.com

Second Circuit Limits Union Authority over Former Employees

In July 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a significant decision limiting a union’s ability to bind former bargaining-unit members to agreements executed after their employment ended. Although the case arose in the context of mandatory arbitration of wage-and-hour claims, the court’s reasoning may have broader implications for collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”), memoranda of agreement (“MOA”), side letters, grievance settlements, and other agreements negotiated after an employee has left the bargaining unit.

The 1199 SEIU v. PSC Community Services Decision

In 2019, 1199 SEIU arbitrated statutory wage-and-hour claims against more than 40 New York City-area home care employers on behalf of more than 100,000 current and former employees. The union relied on a 2015 MOA that required statutory wage claims to be resolved through binding arbitration rather than litigation. The arbitrator ultimately awarded individual damages and directed the creation of a wage fund totaling approximately $30 million.

Several affected workers, however, had left their employment and the bargaining unit before the 2015 MOA was negotiated. Some had already filed wage-and-hour lawsuits in state court before the MOA was executed.

In 1199 SEIU v. PSC Community Services, the Second Circuit held that the arbitration awards could not bind those former employees absent evidence that they had expressly or impliedly authorized the union to continue representing them after they left the bargaining unit. Because the workers were no longer represented by the union when the MOA was negotiated, the union lacked automatic authority to waive their right to pursue statutory claims in court.

The court also held that whether those former employees were bound by the arbitration agreement was a question for the court—not the arbitrator—to decide. Neither the CBA nor the MOA clearly and unmistakably delegated that threshold issue to the arbitrator. As a result, the former employees were permitted to intervene, and the arbitration awards were vacated to the extent they purported to bind those individuals. Those employees remained free to pursue their claims in state court.

The Governing Rule

A union possesses broad authority under federal labor law to negotiate on behalf of employees within its bargaining unit, including the authority to agree to mandatory arbitration of statutory claims. That authority, however, generally extends only to employees the union represents at the time the agreement is executed.

The Second Circuit adopted a rebuttable presumption that a union does not continue to represent former bargaining-unit members after their employment ends. While that presumption may be overcome, there must be evidence demonstrating that the former employee authorized the union to continue acting on his or her behalf or that other facts establish continuing representative authority.

Relevant considerations include the individual’s employment status, continued union membership, any individual agreements with the union, the nature of the rights at issue, and other evidence demonstrating the parties’ understanding regarding continued representation.

Implications for NYECA Contractors

Although 1199 SEIU involved the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, its reasoning may extend well beyond dispute-resolution provisions.

The decision serves as a reminder that a newly negotiated CBA, MOA, side letter, project labor agreement, or grievance settlement may address events that occurred before the agreement was executed, but it does not automatically bind every individual who previously performed bargaining-unit work. Even where an agreement contains retroactive language, retroactivity alone cannot create representative authority that no longer exists.

Accordingly, when evaluating whether a subsequently negotiated agreement applies to a former employee, contractors should consider at least two threshold questions:

  • When did the employee’s claim or right accrue?
  • Did the union possess authority to act on that individual’s behalf when the agreement was negotiated?

If the answer to the second question is no, the agreement may not bind that individual absent separate evidence of authorization.

How the Ruling Affects Union Retirees

The decision also raises questions regarding retirees and the extent to which they remain bound by agreements negotiated after retirement.

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (1971), holding that a fully retired employee with no reasonable expectation of returning to work is generally outside the bargaining unit, even if the individual remains a union member or continues to receive collectively bargained retirement benefits such as a pension. Consequently, a union ordinarily lacks statutory authority to bind such retirees to later agreements.

That said, the analysis remains fact-specific. For example, where a union negotiates changes directly affecting retirees’ accrued retirement benefits or other vested rights, retirees may be deemed represented for those limited purposes. Whether a retiree is bound by a subsequent agreement therefore depends on the nature of the rights involved and the scope of the union’s representative authority with respect to those rights.

Bottom line

For NYECA contractors, 1199 SEIU is fundamentally a decision about representative authority and consent. While a union may negotiate broad contractual provisions for employees it currently represents, it cannot automatically bind former employees or fully retired workers to agreements executed after they leave the bargaining unit.

Accordingly, contractors should carefully evaluate whether post-employment agreements are enforceable against former employees or retirees. The critical inquiry is not simply whether an agreement contains retroactive language, but whether the union possessed authority to act on behalf of the individual when the agreement was negotiated. That question may determine whether the agreement is enforceable or whether the individual remains free to pursue claims outside the contractual framework.

Andrew J. Mundo, Esq.
MURTAGH, COHEN, BYRNE, MURDY & MUNDO
amundo@MCB50Law.com